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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATORY DOCUMENTS IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION IN CHINA 
Wang Jing†  
Judicial review of rules or regulations by the government is 
far from new, but in China it is a novelty.  After the latest revision of 
the Administrative Litigation Law of China (“ALL”) in 2014, courts 
formally began to have authority to review regulatory documents in 
administrative litigation.1  The National People’s Congress of China 
(“NPC”) implemented a new system of reform through supervision 
letters to provincial and city people’s congresses asking they correct 
problems in local regulations (difangxing fagui).  Relatedly, judicial 
review of regulatory documents has become a component of legality 
review and constitutional review in China. 2  
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1 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (中华人民共和国行
政诉讼法) [Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, 
effective Oct. 1, 1990), STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., 
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2006-10/29/content_1499268.htm 
[https://perma.cc/RGF8-68E9] [hereinafter Original ALL].  The official 
translation is Administrative Procedure Law, but in the academic field, it is also 
often referred to as the Administrative Litigation Law. 
2 CHENG SHUWEN (程姝雯) & WANG XIUZHONG (王秀中), Quanguo Renda 
Changweihui Shouci dui Weifa Wenjian Fachu Jiuzheng Dubanhan, Hexianxing 
Shencha yi Jianzaixianshang (全国人大常委会首次对违法文件发出纠正“督办
函” 合宪性审查已箭在弦上) [The Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress Issues Supervision Letters over Enforcement to Correct Illegal 
Provisions and Constitutional Review is in the Offing], NANFANG DUSHI BAO (南
方都市报) [SOUTHERN METROPOLIS DAILY] (Mar. 1, 2018, 00:00 AM), 
https://www.sohu.com/a/224542479_161795 [https://perma.cc/G78G-GSY9]. 
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The ALL can be taken as the starting point of “rule of law 
government” (fazhi zhengfu) in China, giving ordinary people the 
right to directly sue the government.  Since then, the ALL has played 
a unique and significant role in pushing forward the rule of law in 
China, but it also has faced many challenges and criticisms since its 
inception. 3  Over the past twenty years, scholars and experts from 
time to time proposed revisions to the ALL.  With the growth of 
various conflicts in China, dispute resolution has received more 
attention.  The Revised ALL was supposed to be on the legislative 
agenda of the NPC in 2006 but later was postponed due to, among 
other reasons, disagreement on some important issues.  4  On 
December 23, 2013, the draft of revision of ALL was first submitted 
to NPC. 5  Finally, on November 1, 2014, the 11th Session of the 12th 
National People’s Congress adopted the revision of ALL after three 
 
3 See Neysun A. Mahboubi, Suing the Government in China, in 
DEMOCRATIZATION IN CHINA, KOREA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: LOCAL AND 
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 141, 141–155 (Kate Xiao Zhou et al. eds., 2014) 
(discussing the changes and challenges brought by the ALL in China). 
4 The issues in this revision include whether China should and could 
establish an independent administrative court system or another substitute 
mechanism to strengthen independence and fairness of administrative litigation, 
whether the parties can mediate administrative disputes in administrative 
litigation and how they do so, whether the court should expand the scope of 
judicial review and to what extent, whether the court should accept and review 
public interest lawsuits, how to review, how to improve the evidence rules, and 
how to perfect the litigation categories and evidence rules.  See Ying Songnian 
(应松年) & Yang Weidong (杨伟东), Woguo Xingzheng Susong Xiuzheng Chubu 
Shexiang Shang (我国《行政诉讼法》修正初步设想(上)) [Tentative Ideas on 
Amending the Administrative Procedure Law of China I], 10 ZHONGGUO SIFA (中
国司法) [JUST. OF CHINA] 28 (2004). 
5 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiuzheng'an Caoan 
(中华人民共和国行政诉讼法修正案(草案)) [Amendment of the Administrative 
Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft)] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Draft ALL]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/5
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reads. 6  The Revised ALL went into effect on May 1, 2015.7  During 
the revision process of the ALL and its enforcement, scholars, 
officials, judges, and related professional people discussed many 
important issues of the ALL.8  Among the controversial issues that 
 
6 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (中华人民共和国行
政诉讼法) [Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014, 
effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (China) 
[hereinafter Revised ALL].  See Xin Chunying (信春鹰), Guanyu Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa Xiuzheng'an Caoan de Shuoming (关于
《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法修正案(草案)》的说明) [Interpretation on the 
Draft of Administrative Litigation Law Amendment of People’s Republic of 
China], ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中国人大网) [CHINA NPC], 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2014-12/23/content_1892443.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6QEZ-DMMT]. 
7 Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ.  
8 Among these issues, the proposal to establish a separate and independent 
administrative court system outside of the present standard court structure—
similar to maritime courts which were operating well at that time and railway 
courts which were already abolished—was debated and discussed at the 2012 
Annual Conference of China Society of Administrative Law.  It was later 
supported by many scholars, judges, and officials, but did not happen.  At that 
time, the NPC already adopted the former existing judicial reform methods as an 
alternative plan to the independent administrative court system, including 
elevating the jurisdiction of the administrative cases in which the government 
above the county level is the defendant to the intermediate courts and authorizing 
the higher courts to establish circuit tribunals in one provincial region.  But now 
in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, the new courts with cross administration 
regions were established.  They all mainly accept and try administrative litigation 
cases, so they can be regarded as a kind of administrative court.  Lin Hua (林华), 
Zhongguo Xingzheng Faxue Yanjiuhui 2012 Nian Nianhui Zongshu (中国行政法
学研究会 2012年年会综述) [Summary of Annual Conference of Chinese 
Society of Administrative Law in 2012], 26 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU (行政法
学研究) [ADMIN. L. REV.] 138, 138–144 (2013); Ma Huaide(马怀德), Xingzheng 
Shenpan Tizhi Gaige de Mubiao: Sheli Xingzheng Fayuan (行政审判体制改革的
目标: 设立行政法院) [To Establish Administrative Court is the Objective of 
Reform of Administrative Trial System), 3 FALV SHIYONG(法律适用) [JOURNAL 
OF LAW APPLICATION] 8, 8–11(2013); Qiao Wenxin (乔文心), Kua Xingzheng 
Quhua Fayuan: Pochu Sifa Difanghua Fanli (跨行政区划法院:破除司法地方化
藩篱) [Cross-district Court: Break Barriers of Judicial Local Protectionism], 
RENMIN FAYUAN BAo (人民法院报) [PEOPLE'S COURT DAILY] (Nov. 14, 2016).  
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were being debated fiercely, expansion of judicial review was clearly 
an eye-catching topic.  As Professor Hu Jianmiao said, “the changes 
in the scope of administrative litigation could serve as the barometer 
of the advancement of the rule of law in China”.9  Professor Yang 
Weidong also argued: “As to the case scope, the promulgation of the 
ALL is just the start of questions rather than the end of questions.  ”10 
Proposals that “abstract administrative actions” as described below 
can be reviewable in the administrative litigation were put forth long 
ago. 11   There was wide agreement among scholars and other 
commentators that abstract administrative actions should be included 
in judicial review, but some insisted that not all abstract 
administrative actions were appropriate for review in the litigation 
process. 12   In different revision suggestions submitted by the 
 
9  Hu Jianmiao (胡建淼), Zhongguo Xingzheng Susong Fanwei de Yanbian 
yu Quxiang: Huading, Xianzhi, Huifu, Tuozhan (中国行政诉讼范围的演变与趋
向: 划定, 限制, 恢复, 拓展) [Changes and Trends of Scope of Administrative 
Litigation in China: Designation, Limitation, Recovery and Expansion], 23 
ZHENGFA LUNTAN (政法论坛) [TRIB. OF POL. SCI. & L.] 3, 3 (2005). 
10 Yang Weidong (杨伟东), Xingzheng Susong Shouan Fanwei Fenxi (行政
诉讼受案范围分析) [Analysis on Case Scope of Administrative Litigation], 26 
XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU (行政法学研究) [ADMIN. L. REV.] 84, 85 (2004). 
11 See Shi Hongxin (石红心), Lun Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei de Sifa 
Shencha (论抽象行政行为的司法审查) [On Judicial Review of Abstract 
Administrative Actions], 26 YANJIUSHENG FAXUE (研究生法学) [GRADUATE L. 
REV.] 28, 29–33 (1996) (discussing the rationales and the importance of judicial 
review over abstract administrative actions).  In 1997, several judges from the 
basic courts discussed the necessity and the possibility of expanding judicial 
review to abstract administrative actions.  See Qian Cuihua et al. (钱翠华等), 
Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei Nengfou Tiqi Susong de Tantao (抽象行政行为能
否提起诉讼的探讨) [Discussion about Whether Can Sue the Abstract 
Administrative Actions], 16 ZHENGZHI YU FALV (政治与法律) [POL. SCI. & L.] 
20, 20–25 (1997) (listing different judges’ views on if and how to conduct judicial 
review on abstract administrative actions). 
12  Zhan Zhongle (湛中乐), Zhongguo Xingzheng Susongfa Xiuzheng (中国
行政诉讼法修正) [The Amendment of the Administrative Procedure Law of 
China], 7 ZHONGGUO FAXUE QIANYAN (中国法学前沿) [FRONTIERS L. CHINA] 
211, 214 (2012); Xue Gangling (薛刚凌) & Li Chunyan (李春燕), Xingzheng 
Susongfa Xiuding zhi Jiegou Moshi Yanjiu (行政诉讼法修订之结构模式研究) 
[Study on the Structure and Models of Revision of Administrative Litigation 
Law], 2 JIANGSU SHEHUI KEXUE (江苏社会科学) [JIANGSU SOC. SCI.] 116, 120 
(2005).  See Guo Shaofeng (郭少峰), Beida Xuezhe Tijiao Xingzheng Susongfa 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/5
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Supreme People’s Court, several universities, and the China Society 
of Administrative Law, judicial review of regulatory documents was 
mentioned.13  Although the Revised ALL already stipulates judicial 
review of regulatory documents, the debates are still ongoing and 
some controversies have not been settled.  This article aims to review 
the history of debates on this issue, introduce the controversies that 
influenced the revision of the ALL, examine the relationship between 
judicial review of regulatory documents and other similar channels, 
analyze the essence and significance of new changes in the Revised 
ALL concerning judicial review of regulatory documents, and discuss 
several important issues in the implementation of new provisions of 
judicial review of regulatory documents.   
 
Xiugai Yijiangao (北大学者提交《行政诉讼法》修改意见稿) [Scholars from 
Peking University Submitted Opinions on Revision of the Administrative 
Litigation Law], XINJINGBAO (新京报) [THE BEIJING NEWS] (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http://www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2012/02/22/183964.html 
[http://perma.cc/V7VR-RFS7] (reporting scholars submitted opinion on the 
revision of administrative litigation law which touched upon the scope of judicial 
review). 
13 In China, there are four levels of courts including the Supreme People’s 
Court, Provincial Higher People’s Courts, Intermediate People’s Courts, and 
Basic People’s Courts.  The Supreme People’s Court is the court of last resort. 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fayuan Zuzhi Fa (2006 Xiuzheng) (中华人民共
和国人民法院组织法 (2006修正)) [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the 
People’s Republic of China (2006 Revision)] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007), art. 2 & 12. 
China University of Political Science  and law, Peking University, Renmin 
University, and Tsinghua University invited the scholars from all over the country 
to make the suggestions for the revision of the ALL.  The suggestions from 
Peking University proposed that rules and regulatory documents should fall 
within the review scope of administrative litigation incidentally with the specific 
administrative documents, and if the regulatory documents infringe upon a 
citizen’s rights and benefits, the citizen can bring the lawsuit directly. PEKING U. 
RES. CTR. for CONST. L. and ADMIN. L. (北京大学宪法与行政法研究中心), 
Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiugai Jianyigao Beidaban Zhengshi Fabu (《行政诉讼
法)修改建议稿北大版正式发布) [Official Publication of the Amendment to 
Administrative Litigation Law proposed by Peking University scholars], 
http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2012-02/22/content_319118.htm?div=-1 
[https://perma.cc/8XJU-9RQG] (last visited Apr. 10, 2021). 
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I. DEBATES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ABSTRACT 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS 
Despite absorbing and learning about many legal notions and 
theories from common law systems, the whole administrative law 
framework in China represents the heritage of civil law systems.  In 
China, government departments govern society through 
administrative actions.  Academically, all the administrative actions 
can be classified into two groups: (1) “specific” or “concrete” (juti) 
administrative action, which was covered by the ALL for the first 
time since 1989 and became a legal term in codified laws instead of 
a merely an academic term in textbooks; 14  and (2) “abstract” 
(chouxiang) administrative action, which is merely an academic term 
that is not used in any official law or legal document.15  “Specific 
administrative action” refers to the action that is applied to concrete 
persons and situations, such as administrative penalty, administrative 
license, and administrative compulsion and requisition.  “Abstract 
administrative action” refers to the action that can be applied 
generally and in the future. 16   The classification approximately 
equates to rulemaking and adjudication in the U.  S.  17 
Although it is difficult to figure out precisely the distinction 
between specific administrative action and abstract administrative 
 
 
14 Juti Xingzheng Xingwei (具体行政行为) [Specific Administrative 
Action] was substituted by Xingzheng Xingwei (行政行为) [Administrative 
Action] when the Original ALL was revised in 2014. See Revised ALL 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014, 
effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., art. 13. 
15 See Yang Haikun (杨海坤), Dishierzhang Xingzheng Xingwei (第十二章 
行政行为 [Chapter 12 Administative Actions], in DANGDAI ZHONGGUO 
XINGZHENGFA (当代中国行政法) [Contemporary Administrative Law in China] 
(Ying Songnian (应松年) ed., 2018) 783; XINGZHENGFA XUE (行政法学) 
[SCIENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 124 (Hu Jianmiao (胡建淼) ed., 2015). 
16 Id. 
17 Adjudication in the US includes the administrative reconsideration and the 
administrative adjudication in China, so it is broader than specific administrative 
actions in China.  Roughly speaking, we can regard specific administrative 
actions as adjudication.  See Wang Jing(王静), Meiguo Xingzhengfa Faguan 
Zhidu Yanjiu (美国行政法法官制度研究) [Research on the ALJs in the U.S.], 
GUOJIA XINGZHENG XUEYUAN CHUBANSHE (国家行政学院出版社) [CHINESE 
ACADEMY OF GOVERNANCE PUBLISHER] 1, 23–24 (2019).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/5
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action—and occasionally people have different opinions on the 
nature of certain action 18 —this classification remains the most 
important way to understand debates in administrative litigation in 
China.  Article 12 in the Original ALL clearly provides that courts 
only have jurisdiction over specific administrative actions.19  That 
means other actions, including abstract administrative actions, cannot 
be subjects of administrative litigation in the past.20  Courts cannot 
declare that an abstract administrative action is illegal and repeal or 
annul its effect.  Professor Zhang Qianfan believed that “this is one 
of its few peculiar ‘Chinese characteristics.’”21  However, in practice, 
 
18 An example of one on the border is a notice made by the former Ministry 
of Railways, which was dissolved and transferred duties to the Ministry of 
Transport, State Railways Administration, and China Railway Corporation last 
year. It announced that the train ticket prices during Chinese Lunar New Year 
Festival would be raised. Concerning the nature of this notice, the first instance 
court, the court of appeals, the plaintiff, the defendant, and the legal experts all 
had different opinions.  See Tang Yingying (唐莹莹) & Chen Xingyan (陈星言), 
Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei Kesuxing Tanxi: Cong Qiao Zhanxiang Su 
Tiedaobu Chunyun Piaojia Shangfuan Tanqi (抽象行政行为可诉性探析：从乔
占祥诉铁道部春运票价上浮案谈起) [Analysis on Justiciability of Abstract 
Administrative Actions: From Qiao Zhanxiang v. Ministry of Railways], 19 FALV 
SHIYONG (法律适用) [LEGAL APPLICATION] 65, 65–67 (2004) (explaining the 
justifiability of abstract administrative actions). 
19 Original ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ., art. 12. 
20 Article 13 of the Original ALL excludes four kinds of actions in 
administrative litigation, for example, abstract administrative actions which are 
expressed as “administrative regulations and rules or decisions and orders with 
general binding force developed and issued by administrative organs.”  Three 
other kinds of excluded actions are “actions taken by the state in national defense 
and foreign affairs” ,“decisions of administrative agencies on rewards or 
punishments for their employees or the appointment or removal from offices of 
their employees” and “administrative action taken by an administrative agency as 
a final adjudication according to the law.”  These above limitations on the scope 
of jurisdiction over administrative litigation cases may also be changed because 
the scholars strongly proposed to expand the scope of judicial review to so-called 
internal administrative actions, especially those important decisions rendered by 
the administrative organs to the civil servants about appointment, removal, and 
punishment.  Original ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S 
CONG. GAZ., art. 13. 
21 Zhang Qianfan, From Administrative Rule of Law to Constitutionalism?, 3 
ASIA L. REV. 47, 57 (2006). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
2021] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 335 
 
abstract administrative actions often have greater impact on people 
and society than specific administrative actions.  That is the reason 
why scholars and experts have discussed the necessity and feasibility 
of judicial review of abstract administrative actions many times since 
the ALL was drafted in the 1980s.22   
In 1989, in Wang Hanbin’s introduction and interpretation of 
drafting of the ALL to the Standing Committee of the NPC, the scope 
of the court’s jurisdiction in administrative cases was the first 
important issue identified that should be resolved in the ALL and 
should be decided according to some principles. 23  Wang Hanbin 
mentioned that the scope of review should “be enlarged appropriately” 
and “neither interfere in administrative actions .   .   .  nor substitute 
the administration to exercise administrative power”.24  He also used 
phrases like “actual situations” and “be expanded step by step” which 
can be seen as the key words to confine the scope of court’s 
jurisdiction.25  The legislators believed that at the time, based on the 
 
22 Luo Wenyan (罗文燕), Dui Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei Jinxing Sifa 
Shencha de Falv Sikao (对抽象行政行为进行司法审查的法律思考) [Legal Idea 
of Judicial Review of Abstract Administrative Actions], 4 HANGZHOU DAXUE 
XUEBAO (杭州大学学报) [J. HANGZHOU UNIV.] 23, 23–29 (1996); Gao Hong(高
鸿), Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei Kesuxing Yanjiu (抽象行政行为可诉性研究) 
[Research on Sueability of Abstratct Administrative Actions), 4 FALV KEXUE(法
律科学) [SCIENCE OF LAW] 33, 33–39(1997); Ma Huaide(马怀德), Xi Chouxiang 
Xingzheng Xingwei Naru Susong Fanwei zhi Biyaoxing (析抽象行政行为纳入诉
讼范围之必要性) [Necessity of Judicial Review of Abstract Administrative 
Law], 10 RENMIN JIANCHA (人民检察) [PEOPLE'S PROSECUTORIAL MONTHLY] 
12, 12–15 (2001); Gan Wen (甘文), Dui Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei de Sifa 
Shencha (对抽象行政行为的司法审查) [Judicial Review of Abstract 
Administrative Actions], 4 RENMIN SIFA (人民司法) [THE PEOPLE'S JUDICATURE] 
52, 52–53(2002); Lu Weifu (陆维福), Dui Guifanxing Wenjian Shencha Yingdang 
cong Xingzheng Fuyi Yanshendao Sifa Shencha (对规范性文件审查应当从行政
复议延伸到司法审查) [Review of Regulatory Documents Shall be Conducted in 
Judicial Review so does in Administrative Reconsideration), 2 XUESHUJIE (学术
界) [ACADEMICS IN CHINA] 233, 233–237 (2005). 
23 Wang Hanbin (王汉斌), Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng 
Susongfa (Caoan) de Shuoming (关于中华人民共和国行政诉讼法(草案)的说
明) [Interpretation on the Draft of Administrative Litigation Law of People’s 
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actual circumstances, because the administrative litigation really was 
a new legal mechanism, administrative organs needed some time to 
cope with it and courts also needed to accumulate experience, courts 
should review administrative actions, but not all actions, especially 
those documents with a general binding effect.  Thus, the legislature 
chose specific administrative actions as the subject of judicial review 
in the Original ALL draft.26  Since promulgation of the Original ALL, 
the debate about whether judicial review should be expanded to 
abstract administrative actions has remained hot.  Many scholars and 
officials have proposed expanding judicial review to more abstract 
administrative actions, whereas others have opposed doing so.  For 
example, Professor Zou Rong insisted that abstract administrative 
actions cannot be challenged in administrative litigation because we 
cannot design a feasible system to do so.27  Professor Liu Xin also 
opposed expanding the scope of administrative litigation to abstract 
administrative actions because the courts were not equipped to review 
them at that time.28  Even though the discussion about expanding 
judicial review to abstract administrative actions is a broader one, it 
has come to focus especially on low-level regulatory documents for 
which review is more feasible and acceptable.  Professor Ying 
Songnian and Professor Yang Weidong thought in 2004 that 
accepting the regulatory documents under rules in judicial review was 
 
26 Zhang Weiwei (张维炜), Yichang Dianfu Guanguiminjian de Lifa 
Geming: Xingzheng Susongfa Dansheng Lu (一场颠覆”官贵民贱”的立法革命：
行政诉讼法诞生录) [A Legislative Revolution to Overturn the Relationship 
between the Officials and the Ordinary People: Memory of Drafting the 
Administrative Litigation Law], 33 ZHONGGUO RENDA ZAZHI(中国人大杂志) 
[THE PEOPLE’S CONG. OF CHINA] 21, 23 (2014). 
27 Zou Rong (邹荣), Xingzheng Guifan Sifa Shencha de Lujing (行政规范司
法审查的路径) [The Way towards Judicial Review of Administrative Regulatory 
Documents], 15 HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO (华东政法大学学报) 
[ECUPL. L. J.] 118, 119 (2012). 
28 Liu Xin (刘莘), Guanyu Xingzheng Susong Falv Shiyong Zhidu Xiugai de 
Sikao (关于行政诉讼法律适用制度修改的思考) [Thoughts on Revision of 
Legal Application in Administrative Litigation], 107 SUZHOU DAXUE XUEBAO(苏
州大学学报) [SUZHOU U. J.] 67, 70 (2012). 
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better,29 which was accepted by most people in academia and the 
legal practice.30   
II. REASONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATORY 
DOCUMENTS IN CHINA 
With a highly centralized system of government, hierarchical 
control plays a role in China.  It presumes that higher authority has 
more power than lower authority, so legal documents stipulated by a 
higher authority are more authoritative than those stipulated by a 
lower authority.31  As China develops its market economy, more and 
more legislations and regulations are passed, increasing the internal 
legal conflicts among different government departments.  In 2000, 
the NPC passed the Legislation Law (lifa fa), which aimed to 
establish rules for various legislative activities, including legislation 
at the NPC and local People’s Congress levels, and administrative 
legislation by the State Council, its ministries, and local 
governments.32  The Legislation Law sets constraints for legislative 
bodies’ authority as well as procedural requirements based on the 
ALL.  The term “regulatory documents” has a special meaning in 
 
29 Ying Songnian (应松年) & Yang Weidong (杨伟东), Xingzheng Susong 
Xiuzheng Chubu Gouxiang Shang (行政诉讼修正初步构想(上)) [Primary Idea 
about Revision of the ALL I], 10 ZHONGGUO SIFA(中国司法) [JUST. OF CHINA] 
28, 31 (2004). 
  30 Lu Weifu (陆维福), Dui Guifanxing Wenjian Shencha Yingdang cong 
Xingzheng Fuyi Yanshendao Sifa Shencha ( 对规范性文件审查应当从行政复议
延伸到司法审查) [Regulatory Documents Shall Be Reviewed in Judicial 
Procedure as Does in Administrative Reconsideration), 2 XUESHUJIE (学术界) 
[ACADEMICS] 233, 233–237(2005); Wang Zhenmin(王振民), Dui Guifanxing 
Wenjian Jinxing Sifa Shencha de Sange Tezheng (对规范性文件进行司法审查
的三个特征) [Three Characteristics of Judicial Review of Regulatory 
Documents), 10 ZHONGGUO SHENPAN (中国审判) [CHINA TRIAL] 14, 14–15 
(2015). 
31 LIU XIN (刘莘), XINGZHENG LIFA YUANLI YU SHIWU (行政立法原理与实
务) [Theory and Practice of Administrative Legislation] (ZHONGGUO FAZHI 
CHUBANSHE (中国法制出版社) [CHINA LEGAL PUBLISHING HOUSE]) 26(2014) 
32 Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000) 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L 
PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 31 (China). 
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Chinese administrative law. 33   Textually, abstract administrative 
actions include “administrative regulations” (xingzheng fagui), “rules” 
(guizhang), and decisions and orders with general binding force 
formulated and announced by the administration bodies.34  Among 
these documents, administrative rules and regulations are stipulated 
in the Legislation Law and are called “administrative legislation” 
(xingzheng lifa).  Other decisions and orders with general binding 
force are called “regulatory documents” (guifanxing wenjian), “other 
regulatory documents” (qita guifanxing wenjian) or “administrative 
regulatory documents”(xingzeng guifanxing wenjian). 35   Thus, 
normally in textbooks and academic articles, abstract administrative 
actions consist of two categories—administrative legislation and 
regulatory documents. 36   As to the relationship and differences 
among these terms, please refer to the Table about Authorities of 
Administrative Legislation and Regulatory Documents below. 37 
There is no constitutional court or constitutional review in 
China up to the present, so any dispute about the legal documents 
 
33 See Dong Hao (董皞), Dishisanzhang Xingzheng Lifa(第十三章 行政立
法)[Chapter 13 Administrative Legislation], in DANGDAI ZHONGGUO 
XINGZHENGFA (当代中国行政法) [Contemporary Administrative Law in China] 
(Ying Songnian (应松年) ed., 2018) 831. 
34 Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000) 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L 
PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 31 (China). 
35 Sometimes regulatory documents, in the context of the Chinese 
constitutional structure, refer to broader documents that are stipulated not only by 
the administration but also by the legislative and other entities which have the 
authority to establish rules, including the courts and the prosecutors.  Mo Jihong 
(莫纪宏), Guifanxing Wenjian Beian Shencha Zhidu de Hefaxing Yanjiu (规范性
文件备案审查制度的“合法性”研究) [Study on the Legitimacy of the Reference 
and the Review Systems for Regulatory Documents], 10 BEIJING LIANHE DAXUE 
XUEBAO (RENWEN SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) (北京联合大学学报(人文社会科学版)) 
[J. OF BEIJING UNION U. (HUMANITIES & SOC. SCI.)] 104, 107 (2012). 
36 Because regulatory documents are always published with a red title, they 
are also called Hongtou Wenjian [Red-headed Documents], meaning documents 
that have red titles and red stamps.  “Red-headed” in the Modern Chinese 
Dictionary refers to documents announced and published by the Party and 
government institutions, often at the central level, whose names came from the 
red printed title of the documents.  XIANDAI HANYU CIDIAN (现代汉语词典) 
[MODERN CHINESE DICTIONARY] (Dictionary Editing Room at the Inst. of 
Linguistics CASS ed., 6th ed. 2012). 
37 Infra Table. 
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passed by the NPC and the local People’s Congresses cannot be 
submitted to courts.  In the Chinese constitutional structure, the NPC 
has both the supreme status and the highest authority.  Both the State 
Council and the Supreme People’s Court are established by the NPC.  
Thus, it is impossible and inappropriate to supervise the NPC’s 
legislation through judicial review.  Further, since upper-level 
documents belong to the category of legislation and are called 
“administrative legislation,” upper-level documents should not be 
challenged in courts. 38 
Another explanation of why the control and supervision of 
regulatory documents should be prioritized is the reality of these 
documents.  In short, regulatory documents create many problems.39  
The reasons regulatory documents are problematic are as follows: 
First, the number of regulatory documents is considerable, so 
problems they cause seem more obvious.  According to Article 90 of 
the Constitution of China, upper-level governments have the 
authority to issue decisions and orders.  “Ministries and commissions 
issue orders, directives and regulations within the jurisdiction of their 
respective departments and in accordance with statutes, 
administrative rules and regulations, decisions and orders issued by 
the State Council.”40  Similar provisions also appear in Article 107 of 
the Constitution of China, which grant power to lower level 
governments to issue such documents. 41   Therefore, not only do 
 
  38 Qin Qianhong (秦前红) & Ye Haibo (叶海波), Xianfa Susong: Yige 
Pipanxing Fenxi (宪法诉讼: 一个批判分析) [Constitutional Litigation:Critical 
Analysis], 2 HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO (华东政法大学学报) [ECUPL. 
L. J.] 12, 12–17(2003).  
39 Zhan Zhongle (湛中乐), Lun Xingzheng Fagui, Xingzheng Guizhang 
Yiwai de Qita Guifanxing Wenjian (论行政法规、行政规章以外的其他规范性
文件) [Discussion on Other Regulatory Documents except Administrative 
Regulations and Administrative Rules], 9 ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINA LEGAL SCI.] 
108, 112 (1992). 
40 The decisions and orders issued include both regulatory documents with 
general binding and specific actions with specific binding.  XIANFA (宪法) 
[Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 4, 1982, effective Dec. 4, 1982, amended Mar. 14, 2004), 
art. 90 (China). 
41 Article 107 of the Constitution provides that people’s governments of 
townships, nationality townships, and towns carry out the resolutions of the 
people’s congress at the corresponding level as well as decisions and orders of the 
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provincial and larger city governments issue regulatory documents, 
but all local governments at different levels have authority to 
formulate various regulatory documents. 42   That means local 
governments at various levels, the central government, and its 
ministries and commissions all formulate regulatory documents.  
These governments and agencies have long counted on regulatory 
documents to exercise administrative power because regulatory 
documents always have a general application and have the force of 
law in practice.  It is said that 85% of effective documents in the 
administration are regulatory documents made by governments at 
various levels.43  Based on the estimated number of the authorities 
which can establish regulatory documents, as shown in the following 
table, it is difficult to calculate the exact number of regulatory 
documents formulated nationwide. 44   Due to the huge scale of 
regulatory documents, related problems, including conflicts among 
documents issued at different levels, are inevitable.   
 




Regulations State Council 1 
 
state administrative organs at the next higher level, and conduct administrative 
work in their respective administrative areas. XIANFA, art. 107 (1982) (China). 
42 XIANFA, art. 107 (1982) (China). 
43 Wu Jing (吴兢), Rang Gongzhong Youquan Zhuanggao Hongtou Wenjian 
(让公众有权状告“红头文件”) [Let the Public Have the Right to Sue “Red-





44 The number of regulatory documents passed by State Council is 150. And 
the number of regulatory documents passed by ministries and commissions of the 
State Council is 92,917.  See PEKING UNIVERSITY LEGAL INFORMATION 
NETWORK, www.Pkulaw.cn [https://perma.cc/NR9W-GS4X] (last visited Apr. 10, 
2021).  The number of regulatory documents passed by local governments and 
their bureaus and offices is unclear.  The author conservatively estimate that it is 
in the millions. 
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commissions, and other 
organs endowed with 
administrative 
functions directly under 
State Council47 







governments, and 284 
municipal cities with 
subordinate districts49 
 
45 The number of rules passed by ministries and commissions of the State 
Council is 5,816. See LAWS & REGULATIONS DATABASE, 
http://search.chinalaw.gov.cn/search2.html [https://perma.cc/Z5WQ-MGLE]. 
46 Article 80 of the Legislation Law provides, “[t]he ministries and 
commissions of the State Council, the People's Bank of China, the State Audit 
Administration, and other divisions with administrative functions directly under 
the State Council may, in accordance with the laws and the administrative 
regulations, decisions, and orders of the State Council, develop rules within their 
respective power.”  Lifa Fa (2015 Xiuzheng) (中华人民共和国立法法(2015修
正)) [The Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China (2015 
Amendment)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective 
July 1, 2000, amended Mar. 15, 2015), art. 80, translated in Lawinfochina 
[hereafter Revised Lifa Fa].  
47 Wang Yong (王勇), Guanyu Guowuyuan Jigou Gaige Fang’an de 
Shuoming (关于国务院机构改革方案的说明) [The Interpretation of Reform 
Program of The State Council] (Mar. 14, 2018, 03:03 AM), 
http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2018-03/14/content_5273856.htm 
[https://perma.cc/E4KZ-646J].  
48 The number of rules passed by local governments is 30,750.  See LAWS & 
REGULATIONS DATABASE, supra note 44.  
49 Before the Legislation Law was revised in 2015, municipal authorities 
with the power to enact local rules mainly referred to 49 larger cities, including 27 
provincial capital cities, 18 larger cities approved by the State Council, and 4 
cities where special economic regions are located.  Lifa Fa (2000 Xiuzheng) (中
华人民共和国立法法) [Law on Legislation Legislation of the People’s Republic 
of China], art. 63, 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 31 
(China).  According to the revision of the Legislation Law in 2015, all 284 cities 
with subordinate districts, instead of larger cities, have local legislative power, but 
only on managing city affairs, including urban construction, city appearance 
management, and environmental protection.  Revised Lifa Fa (promulgated by the 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000, amended Mar. 15, 
2015), art. 72, translated in Lawinfochina.  
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More than 43,000 
authorities50 
Table: Authorities of Administrative Legislation and Regulatory Documents 
Secondly, in practice, regulatory documents are always direct 
guidelines for civil servants to execute laws and exercise 
administrative power.  In Chinese bureaucracy, civil servants in lower 
level governments and agencies are reluctant to check upper level 
legal documents and usually would directly apply the regulatory 
documents announced by themselves or superior organs.  So even if 
there is something wrong with the regulatory documents, 
administrative organs still tend to comply with them in rendering 
administrative decisions, such as administrative penalties or orders of 
relocation and home demolition.51 
 
50 As of September 2016, there were 34 provincial governments and 334 
prefectural level governments (diji xingzhengqu), including 294 prefectural cities 
(dijishi), but only 49 larger cities with the authority to formulate local rules before 
the revision of the Legislation Law in 2015.  Now 284 cities with subordinate 
districts also have limited authorities to formulate local rules. Li Jianguo(李建国), 
Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifafa Xiuzheng'an Caoan de Shuoming 
(关于《中华人民共和国立法法修正案(草案)》的说明) [Interpretation on the 
Draft of Legislation Law Amendment of People’s Republic of China],ZHONGGUO 
RENDA WANG (中国人大网) [CHINA NPC], 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2015-05/07/content_1939099.htm. Last 
visited Apr 13, 2021.  For the governments at the county level, there are 1,464 
counties in China out of a total of 2,851.  There are 40,703 governments at the 
village (town) level. It is impossible to calculate the number of bureaus and other 
subordinates local governments, which are also authorized to formulate regulatory 
documents.  So the number of authorities must greatly exceed the county-level 
divisions, including autonomous counties, county-level cities, banners, 
autonomous banners, autonomous counties, county-level cities, banners, 
autonomous banners, and city districts.  Peng Dongyu (彭东昱), Fuyu Shequ de 
Shi Difang Lifaquan (赋予设区的市地方立法权) [Authorization of Legislation 
Power to Cities with Subordinates], 19 ZHONGGUO RENDA ZAZHI (中国人大杂
志) [THE PEOPLE’S CONG. OF CHINA] 25, 25–26 (2014). 
51 In 2009, Ms. Da Lijuan was denied from taking the entrance examination 
for public school teacher positions because she was 149 cm tall.  According to the 
regulatory document stipulated by the Hunan Education Bureau, the height 
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Furthermore, regulatory documents lack enough supervision 
and procedural controls.  Compared to administrative legislation, 
clear mandatory requirements for issuing regulatory documents are 
not enough.  In the Regulations on Rules Legislation Procedure 
(Guizhang Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli) promulgated by the State 
Council in 2001, Article 36 provides that local governments above 
the county level, which do not have the authority to formulate rules, 
shall take the procedure in that Regulation as reference to formulate 
and publish decisions and orders with general binding force.52  More 
and more provinces and cities announced local rules on the procedure 
of the regulatory documents.  On May 31, 2018, the General Office 
of the State Council required all governments and departments to 
obey the rule of law, control the number of regulatory documents, 
complete the process, and hear public opinions and expert 
suggestions.53  Nevertheless, most of the procedural requirements of 
 
requirement for female teachers is 150 cm and 160 cm for male teachers.  But in 
the related documents of the Education Ministry, the Health Ministry under the 
State Council, and the China Disabilities Association, there was no height 
requirement.  Therefore, Ms. Da, along with three male candidates who were 
under 160 cm in height, sued the Education Bureau.  Though they failed in the 
administrative litigation, Hunan Education Bureau deleted the height requirement 
article in its regulatory document.  Shen Xinwang (申欣旺) & Bai Zukai (白祖
偕), “Xunfu Quanli” de Shiyan (“驯服权力”的实验) [Experiment to Tame the 
Power], ZHONGGUO XINWEN ZHOUKAN (中国新闻周刊) [CHINA NEWSWEEK], 
May 17, 2010, at 26. 
52 Guizhang Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli (规章制定程序条例) [Regulations on 
Procedures for the Formulation of Rules ] (promulgated by the St. Council, Nov. 
16, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), 2001 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ. 322, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61556.htm 
[https://perma.cc/THH7-Q76T]. 
53 Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Jiaqiang Xingzheng Guifanxing 
Wenjian Zhiding he Jiandu Guanli Gongzuo de Tongzhi (国务院办公厅关于加
强行政规范性文件制定和监督管理工作的通知) [Notice to Strengthen 
Enactment and Supervision of Administrative Regulatory Documents] (published 
by the General Office of the State Council) (promulgated by the General Office of 
the State Council, May 31, 2018), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2018-
05/31/content_5295071.htm [https://perma.cc/WNU2-CA2Y].  Another important 
document is Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Quanmian Tuixing Xingzheng 
Guifanxing Wenjian Hefaxing Shenhe Jizhi de Zhidao Yijian (关于全面推行行
政规范性文件合法性审核机制的指导意见) [Guidance on Completely Pushing 
Forward Legal Review of Administrative Regulatory Documents] (promulgated 
by the General Office of the State Council, effective Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/5
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regulatory documents were not spelled out clearly and tended to be 
handled internally rather than via standardized external channels, for 
example, allowing public participation and ensuring transparency.  
According to Yang Shujun’s research, 31 provincial governments and 
21 provincial rules provided that only governments have the power 
to draft regulatory documents; although people pay more attention to 
the hearing and other methods of collecting public opinion, local rules 
do not give clear and efficient provisions about requirements for and 
methods of public participation.54 
Regulatory documents are used to issue licenses, assess 
penalties, apply compulsory enforcement, acquire goods and services, 
and perform other actions.  They are usually in the form of decisions, 
orders, notices, and even meeting summaries, involving salary, social 
benefits, endowment insurance, awards for investment promotion, 
and so on.  Consequently, it is not very difficult to find some 
problematic examples.  For instance, before the Administrative 
Licensing Law took effect in 2004, various documents established 
administrative licenses and permits.  One local government published 
a regulatory document requiring all producers of steamed bread 
(mantou) to get a permit from the steam bread administration offices, 
which touched upon the most popular and traditional staple food in 
northern China.  The farce finally ended after the city office battled 




54 Yang Shujun conducted research on the local rules of regulatory procedure.  
He found that out of 80 local governments with the authority to provide local 
rules, 46 of them passed local rules to regulate the procedures of regulatory 
documents.  Notably, out of 31 provincial governments, 21 provincial 
governments passed local rules on the procedure of the regulatory documents and 
most of the local rules used the term “regulatory documents” while other rules 
used the term “administrative regulatory documents” and “administrative organs 
regulatory documents.”  Yang Shujun (杨书军), Guifanxing Wenjian Zhiding 
Chengxu Lifa de Xianzhuang ji Wanshan (规范性文件制定程序立法的现状及
完善) [Current Situations and Improvement of Legislation for the Procedures of 
Regulatory Documents], 21 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU (行政法学研究) [ADMIN. 
L. REV.] 86, 86–87 (2013). 
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food workshop at the same time.55  This type of example 56 is the 
reason why China has the Administrative Licensing Law to govern 
permits and licenses, and why the law provides clearly that 
documents at different levels can only stipulate certain types of 
permits and licenses, and that regulatory documents cannot establish 
any permit and license.  However, the results of executing this law 
are unsatisfactory.   
Overall, it is necessary to review regulatory documents in 
China in order to protect the rights and interests of citizens.  It is 
especially important for courts to contribute to this goal and push 
forward advancement of the rule of law in China.   
Additionally, judges and courts have the capacity to review 
abstract administrative actions.  In the discussion about the possibility 
of reviewing abstract administrative actions, including regulatory 
documents, some scholars argued that courts and judges were 
incompetent to review abstract administrative actions. 57   The 
 
55 Liu Xuezeng (刘学增), Shenbian Linshi Bangongshi Pandian: Zhengzhou 
ceng Chengli Mantouban (身边临时办公室盘点: 郑州曾成立馒头办) 
[Summary of Temporary Offices in Daily Life: Offices of Steamed Bread 
Administration once were Established in Zhengzhou], DAHAEBAO (大河报) 
[GREAT RIVER NEWS] (Sept. 17, 2014). 
56 It is not difficult to find other similar examples.  In 2007, Pinghe County 
Government in Fujian Province published regulatory documents providing that 
young men without a junior high school diploma would not be eligible to obtain 
certificates of labor, labor permits, marriage certificates, or driver’s licenses from 
governments at the village level or the education departments including but not 
limited to, education, labor, industry and commerce, public security, civil 
administration.  Such actions were criticized and later canceled by the 
government.  See Lin Xiaoqi (林晓琪), Fujian Pinghe Guiding Weiqude 
Chuzhong Biyezhengzhe Buneng Banli Jiehunzheng (福建平和规定未取得初中
毕业证者不能办理结婚证) [Pinghe County Government in Fujian Stipulated, 
No Junior High School Diploma, No Marriage Certificate], DONGNAN KUAIBAO  
(东南快报) [SOUTHEAST EXPRESS] (Mar. 28, 2007) 
  See also IUD Zhongguo Zhengwu Jingqi Jiance Zhongxin (IUD中国政务
景气监测中心) [IUD Chinese Gov’t Aff. Situation Monitoring Center], 2009 
Nian Liuda Zuiju Zhengyixing “Hongtou Wenjian” (2009年六大最具争议性“红
头文件”) [The Six Most Controversial Red-headed Documents in 2009], 16 
LINGDAO JUECE XINXI ZHOUKAN(领导决策信息周刊) [INFO. FOR DECIDERS 
MAG.] 16, 16–17 (2009). 
57 Liu Junxiang(刘俊祥),Lun Woguo Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei de Sifa 
Shencha (论我国抽象行政行为的司法审查) [Judicial Review of Abstract 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/5
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arguments mainly focused on the following points.  First, at least 
according to legal provisions, abstract administrative actions made by 
governments are the collective product of discussions and 
government conferences.  The head of the government cannot decide 
to issue it by himself without any discussion with other administrative 
officials, especially roughly same-level officials.  Hence, 
theoretically, since abstract administrative actions are decided by a 
group of people, it is improper for one judge or several judges to 
reverse them, or even review them.  Second, judges do not have the 
expertise needed to review abstract administrative actions, compared 
to the expertise of the officers in the governments.  Third, it is not 
easy for courts to review specific administrative actions, so it will be 
even harder for them to review abstract administrative actions.  This 
debate ended after Revised ALL was passed.  But the issues remain 
in practice.   
III. JURISDICTION OF COURTS OVER REGULATORY 
DOCUMENTS IN THE PAST 
Whether the Revised ALL in 2014 is to expand judicial 
review to regulatory documents is controversial because from the 
perspective of some academics and judges, courts already have 
jurisdiction over abstract administrative actions to some extent.58  In 
the Original ALL, Articles 5259 and 5360 provided that the court  shall 
take laws, administrative regulations, and local regulations as the 
legal basis for specific administrative actions, which is called “taking 
as legal basis” (yiju).  And the court shall take rules as reference, 
which is called “reference” (canzhao).  “Taking as a legal basis” and 
 
Administrative Actions), XIANDAI FAXUE(现代法学) [MODERN LAW SCIENCE] 
69, 69–74(1999).  
58 See Wang Tiancheng (王天成), Zhirenzhe Zhiyufa—Xingzhengfa yu 
Renquan (治人者治于法—行政法与人权) [Governor Who Governs People 
Shall be Governed by Law—Administrative Law and Human Rights], 14 
ZHONGWAI FAXUE (中外法学) [PEKING U. L. J.] 29, 34 (1992). 
59 Original ALL, (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ., arts. 52. 
60 Original ALL, (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ., art. 53. 
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“reference” are different according to the intent of the legislators.  
“Taking as a legal basis” means that law, administrative regulations, 
and local regulations are binding and courts cannot review their 
legality and shall respect and obey them.  But “reference” is different 
from “taking as a legal basis” in that a rule may or may not be binding 
depending on its legality.  Wang Hanbin’s introduction and 
explanation of drafting the ALL for the Standing Committee of the 
NPC noted that there were varying opinions about “reference. ”  He 
explained, “if the rule is consistent with laws and administrative 
regulations, the court shall take it as the reference; and if the rule is 
inconsistent or not totally consistent with principles and spirit of laws 
and administrative regulations, the court may have the room to deal 
with regulations freely”.61   In the 1990s, there were two sorts of 
opinions concerning whether the court can review abstract 
administrative actions: most did not think the court possessed the 
authority to review abstract administrative actions, including 
Professor Luo Haocai and Professor Ying Songnian, who were the 
deputy directors of the Administrative Legislation Team under the 
Standing Committee of the NPC.  62  Meanwhile, some scholars 
argued the court did, if fact, have the authority.63   
In May 2004, Guanyu Shenli Xingzheng Anjian Shiyong Falv 
Guifan Wenti de Zuotanhui Jiyao [Summary of Seminar on 
Application of Legal Documents in the Trial of Administrative Cases] 
(“2004 Summary”), published by the Supreme People’s Court, which 
is not a formal judicial interpretation, but is always regarded as 
among the most important guidance for courts, stipulated that if 
 
61 Wang Hanbin (王汉斌), Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng 
Susongfa (Caoan) de Shuoming (关于《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法(草案)》的
说明) [Interpretation on the Draft of Administrative Litigation Law of People’s 
Republic of China], 5 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZUIGAO RENMIN 
FAYUAN GONGBAO (最高人民法院公报) [SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ] 11, 12–13 
(1989). 
62 LUO HAOCAI (罗豪才), ZHONGGUO SIFA SHENCHA ZHIDU (中国司法审查
制度) [JUDICIAL REVIEW SYSTEM IN CHINA] 15–16 (Luo Haocai ed., 2003); YING 
SONGNIAN (应松年) XINGZHENG SUSONG FAXUE (行政诉讼法学) [SCIENCE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION] 88 (Ying Songnian et al. eds., 1994). 
63 Wang Tiancheng (王天成), Zhirenzhe Zhiyufa—Xingzhengfa yu Renquan 
(治人者治于法—行政法与人权) [Governor Who Governs People Shall be 
Governed by Law—Administrative Law and Human Rights], 14 ZHONGWAI 
FAXUE (中外法学) [PEKING U. L. J.] 29, 34 (1992). 
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courts identify concrete applicable interpretations and other 
regulatory documents which are guidelines of specific administrative 
actions, as legal, effective, and reasonable after reviewing them, 
courts shall confirm the effect of the regulatory documents when 
confirming the legitimacy of specific administrative actions.  
Otherwise, courts can refuse to apply regulatory documents, which is 
called “non-application” (bushiyong).64   Later, more scholars and 
experts expressed their ideas about it.  Jiang Bixin, the former Vice 
President of the Supreme People’s Court, stated that the ALL 
authorizes courts to review regulatory documents and to confirm 
whether regulatory documents are legal or not.65   Professor Xing 
Hongfei stated that the idea that abstract administrative actions 
cannot be judicially reviewed was a misunderstanding, and that 
courts can conduct judicial review of abstract administrative actions 
without any violation of current legal provisions.66   
From the above legal provisions, some scholars and judges 
argue that while the defendant bears the burden of proof in 
challenging the legality of regulatory documents and courts shall 
review their legality instead of applying them directly, courts already 
have jurisdiction over abstract administrative documents.  In fact, in 
early 1996, Dr.  Shi Hongxin, who later became a judge in a Beijing 
court, argued that the difference between the supporting view and 
opposing opinion was how to define the judicial review.67  If the non-
 
64 Guanyu Shenli Xingzheng Anjian Shiyong Falv Guifan Wenti de 
Zuotanhui Jiyao (关于审理行政案例适用法律规范问题的座谈会纪要) 
[Summary of Seminar on Application of Legal Documents in the Trial of 
Administrative Cases], RENMIN FAYUANBAO(最高人民法院公报) [PEOPLE’S CT. 
DAILY], June 1, 2004. 
65 Jiang Bixin (江必新), Xingzheng Susong yu Chouxiang Xingzheng 
Xingwei (《行政诉讼法》与抽象行政行为) [Administrative Litigation Law and 
Abstract Administrative Actions], 12 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU(行政法学研究) 
[ADMIN. L. REV.] 13, 13–14, 23 (2009). 
66 Xing Hongfei (邢鸿飞), Jinqu Haishi Wuqu? Chouxiang Xingzheng 
Xingwei Sifa Shencha de Xianzhuang ji Chulu (禁区还是误区? 抽象行政行为司
法审查的现状及出路) [Forbidden Zone or Misunderstanding? Present Situations 
and Outlets for the Judicial Review of Abstract Administrative Actions], 10 
HEHAI DAXUE XUEBAO (河海大学学报) [J. HOHAI U.] 43, 43–47 (2008). 
67 Shi Hongxin(石红心), Lun Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei de Sifa Shencha 
(论抽象行政行为的司法审查) [On Judicial Review of Abstract Administrative 
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application of regulatory documents is classified as judicial review, 
judges and courts already have some kind of authority to review both 
rules and regulatory documents.68 
Nevertheless, in the author’s opinion, non-application of 
regulatory documents in administrative litigation cannot be regarded 
as a formal mechanism of judicial review.  Especially speaking more 
broadly, we cannot describe non-application as judicial review.  Non-
application in China is a fleeting decision about legal provisions 
rather than a complete and observable judicial review.69  Because 
even if courts find problems in regulatory documents and conclude 
that they are illegal or inappropriate—and thus refuse to apply 
them—nobody can see a single word or sentence of the judge’s 
evaluation of the regulatory documents in the judgment.  Apart from 
the parties represented in the case and judges presiding, no one is 
privy to the interpretation of regulatory documents.  If agencies or 
governments do not revise or repeal regulatory documents, those who 
challenge regulatory documents can bring lawsuits to new judges and 
courts who may issue a different judgment.  The outcomes of cases 
will be uncertain because there is no system to coordinate opinions 
across judges and courts.  As a result, non-application of regulatory 
documents only affects individual cases instead of the broad and 
consistent application of regulatory documents.  Without supervision 
 
Actions], 3 YANJIUSHENG FAXUE (研究生法学) [GRADUATE L. REV.] 28, 29–33 
(1996). 
68 Id. 
69 Chen Aihua Su Nanjingshi Jiangningqu Zhufang he Chengxiang Jiansheju 
Bulvxing Fangwu Dengji Fading Zhizean (陈爱华诉南京市江宁区住房和城乡
建设局不履行房屋登记法定职责案) [Chen Aihua v. the Bureau of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development of Jiangning District, Nanjing City], 2014 SUP. 
PEOPLE’S CT GAZ. 8 (Nanjing Interm. People’s Ct. 2013) (Dr. Xu Xiaodong 
studied the Chen Aihua case published in the Gazette of the Supreme People’s 
Court in 2014 and found the judge did not render direct judgment of the notice of 
two ministries, but in the Gazette the Supreme People’s Court expressed clearly 
that the notice violated laws and statutes was not binding.).  See Xu Xiaodong (徐
肖东), Xingzheng Susong Guifanxing Wenjian Fudai Shencha de Renzhi jiqi 
Shixian Jizhi—yi Chen Aihua An yu Huayuan Gongsi An weizhu de Fenxi (行政
诉讼规范性文件附带审查的认知及其实现机制—以陈爱华案与华源公司案
为主的分析) [Recognition and Realization Mechanism of Incidental Review of 
regulatory documents in Administrative Litigation: Taking Chen Aihua Case and 
Huayuan Gongsi Case as Main Example], 19 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU (行政法
学研究) [ADMIN. L. REV.] 69, 69–83(2016). 
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or legal remedy, it is difficult to classify non-application of regulatory 
documents as judicial review.   
On the other hand, courts and judges often execute non-
application of regulatory documents differently than we may 
expect.70  The conclusions are not taken directly from the ALL; rather, 
as Professor Zhu Xinli argues, they are inferred from the ALL.71  
Likewise, the 2004 Summary is not the law or even the formal 
judicial interpretation, so the conclusion that courts have jurisdiction 
over some abstract administrative actions is not true.  The 
interpretation is not clear and persuasive enough for all the judges to 
understand and handle.  As a result, how the courts deal with 
regulatory documents depends entirely on particular circumstances 
and the ability of judges.  Thus, it is not surprising to learn that many 
courts and judges, particularly at the grassroots level, prefer to apply 
rules and regulatory documents as legal rules instead of judging their 
legitimacy before applying them.  In Judge Wang Qingting’s 2010 
statistics and survey, he drew the conclusion that judges who seldom 
review regulatory documents and regulatory documents in 
administrative litigation play the role of “invisible law”.72   If the 
judges in Shanghai do not realize they have the power to review 
regulatory documents—and in practice they are reluctant to do so—
then it is safe to assume that judges outside of the largest cities such 
 
70 Yu Jun (余军) & Zhangwen (张文), Xingzheng Guifanxing Wenjian Sifa 
Shenchaquan de Shixiaoxing Kaocha (行政规范性文件司法审查权的实效性考
察) [Research on Effectiveness of Judicial Review Power of Administrative 
Regulatory Documents], 63 FAXUE YANJIU (法学研究)[CHINESE JOURNAL OF 
LAW] 42, 42–61 (2016). 
71 Zhu Xinli (朱新力), Lun Fayuan dui Guizhang Yixia de Xingzheng 
Guifanxing Wenjian de Shenchaquan (论法院对规章以下的行政规范性文件的
审查权) [On the Review Power of Regulatory Documents under Rules for the 
Courts], 14 FAXUE ZAZHI (法学杂志) [LEGAL SCI. MAG.] 18, 18 (1993). 
72 Wang Qingting (王庆廷), Yinxing de “Falü”—Xingzheng Susong zhong 
Qita Guifanxing Wenjian de Yihua jiqi Jiaozheng (隐形的”法律”—行政诉讼中
其他规范性文件的异化及其矫正) [Invisible “Law” :The Abnormity and 
Correction of Other regulatory documents in Administrative Litigation], XIANDAI 
FAXUE PINGLU [MOD. L. SCI.] 82, 82–89 (2011) (Wang Qingting found 30 cases 
involving questions about regulatory documents and at the same time sent 50 
surveys about this to judges—getting 40 back, which is almost one third of the 
whole number of administrative judges in Shanghai.  The author is the judge in 
the district court in Shanghai.). 
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as Beijing and Shanghai will be extremely unlikely to do so.  We also 
get the same impression from other instances where courts neither 
accept cases in which plaintiffs merely claim that regulatory 
documents are illegal, nor truly review regulatory documents in 
previously accepted cases that are clearly related to regulatory 
documents. 73 
In sum, there is no real judicial review of regulatory 
documents in China before the Revised ALL in 2014.  The Revised 
ALL is the beginning of judicial review of regulatory documents, 
which deserves to be recorded and examined further.   
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATORY DOCUMENTS 
COOPERATES WITH OTHER MECHANISM 
Judicial review is an essential process for correcting and 
supervising regulatory documents while cooperating with other 
formal and legal channels to scrutinize regulatory documents and 
resolve conflicts among them.74 
 
73 See Wang Jing (王静), Cong Xingsu Anjian Kan Laojiao Zhidu Biange 
Lujing (从行诉案件看劳教制度变革路径) [Debate on Reform Path of Re-
education through Labor: Administrative Litigation Cases Study], 3 GUOJIA 
XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO (国家行政学院学报) [J. CHINESE ACAD. GOV’T.] 
97, 97–102 (2012) (Similar situations happen in administrative litigation when 
courts have the authority to take the rules as reference. In practice, judges are 
reluctant to review the rules. For instance, re-education through labor had been 
criticized for many years before the system was abolished by the National 
Peoples’ Congress in 2013. Concerning this system, there are two legal 
documents: one is the administrative regulations promulgated by the State 
Council in 1950s and another one is the rule promulgated by Ministry of Public 
Affairs in 1980s. Before 2013, in administrative litigation cases, judges seldom 
reviewed the legality of the rule and applied it directly. Only in several cases did 
the judges apply the law of the NPC and did not apply the above documents.). 
74 See Supreme People’s Court, Xingzheng Susong Fudai Shencha 
Guifanxing Wenjian Dianxing Anli Xinwen Fabuhui (行政诉讼附带审查规范性
文件典型案例新闻发布会) [News Release Conference on Typical 
Administrative Litigation Cases with Incidental Review of Regulatory 
Documents], CHINA COURT.ORG (Oct. 30, 2018, 11:10 AM), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-125531.html [http://perma.cc/3KYK-
VCFR] (Huang Yongwei, the chief judge of the administrative tribunal said that 
judicial review of regulatory documents is helpful to push forward administration 
according to law and legality of regulatory documents and to safeguard 
consistence of legal system.). 
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The first channel to correct illegal or improper orders and 
decisions (including abstract administrative actions) is under the 
authority and responsibility of governments at higher levels.75  The 
State Council reserves the ability to alter or annul inappropriate 
orders, directives, and regulations issued by ministries or 
commissions and to alter or annul inappropriate decisions and orders 
issued by local organs of state administration at different levels.  
Local governments at and above the county level have the power to 
alter or annul inappropriate decisions of their subordinate 
departments and people’s governments at lower levels.76   
The second channel to supervise abstract administrative 
actions of local government at various levels is the local people’s 
congress at the corresponding level.77  The standing committees of 
local people’s congresses at and above the county level have power 
to annul inappropriate decisions and orders of government at the 
corresponding level.78   For superior government and congress to 
superintend problems of abstract administrative actions, Recording 
and Review (Beian Shencha) plays a role.  According to the provision 
of the Legislation Law and related regulations, administrative 
 
75 XIANFA (宪法) [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 4, 1982, effective Dec. 4, 1982, 
amended Mar. 14, 2004), arts. 89, 108 (2004). 
76 Difang Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui he Difang Geji Renmin Zhengfu 
Zuzhifa (地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法) [Organic Law of 
the Local People's Congress and Local People's Governments of the PRC] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., July.1, 1979, effective July.1, 1979, 
amended Aug. 9,2015) (China), art. 59(2004).  Article 59 stipulates: A local 
people's government at or above the county level shall exercise the following 
functions and powers: (3) to alter or annul inappropriate orders and directives of 
its subordinate departments and inappropriate decisions and orders of the people's 
governments at lower levels. 
77 Difang Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui he Difang Geji Renmin Zhengfu 
Zuzhifa (地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法) [Organic Law of 
the Local People's Congress and Local People's Governments of the PRC] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., July.1, 1979, effective July.1, 1979, 
amended Aug. 9,2015)(China), art. 8(2004).  Article 8 stipulates: Local people's 
congresses at and above the county level shall exercise the following functions 
and powers: (11) to annul inappropriate decisions and orders of the people's 
governments at the corresponding level. 
78 XIANFA (宪法) [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 4, 1982, effective Dec. 4, 1982, 
amended Mar. 14, 2004), art. 104 (2004). 
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regulations shall be sent to be recorded and reviewed by the Standing 
Committee of National People’s Congress, while the rules of 
ministries and local rules of local governments shall be sent to be 
recorded and reviewed by superior governments. 79   Regulatory 
documents should also be recorded and reviewed by superiors.80  In 
the past, superior governments and congresses were reluctant to 
review every regulatory document carefully enough to find problems.  
Recently, these bodies pay more attention to the Recording and 
Review and are making efforts to strengthen it.81   
The third method is Sorting Out (Qingli): when a new law or 
superior legal document is formulated or revised, governments and 
congresses at various levels need to check and revise their own 
legislation and regulatory documents to ensure compliance.82  This 
method also has its own limitations because the Sorting Out process 
 
79 Revised Lifa Fa (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, 
effective July 1, 2000, amended Mar. 15, 2015), art. 72, translated in 
LawinfoChina. 
80 Fagui Guizhang Beian Shencha Tiaoli (法规规章备案审查条例) 
[Recording and Review of Rules and Regulations] (promulgated by St. Council., 
Dec.14, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002). 
81 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Fazhi Gongzuo 
Weiyuanhui Fazhi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui Guanyu 2019 nian Beian Shencha 
Gongzuo Qingkuang de Baogao (全国人民代表大会常务委员会法制工作委员
会关于 2019年备案审查工作情况的报告) [Report on Recording and Review in 
2019 by Legal Affairs Committee of the Standing Committee of the Nat’l 
People’s Cong.], Di Shisan Jie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu 
Weiyuanhui Di Shiwu Ci Huiyi (第十三届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第十
五次会议) [The 15th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th Nat’l 
People’s Cong.] (Dec. 25, 2019), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201912/24cac1938ec44552b285f0708f78c94
4.shtml [https://perma.cc/4BR4-RKSU]. 
82 In 2011, before Guoyou Tudishang Fangwu Zhengshou Yu Buchang Tiaoli 
(国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例)[Regulation on the Expropriation of 
Buildings on State-owned Land and Compensation] (promulgated by the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China, January 21, 2011), the governments at 
various levels annulled 3,918 regulatory documents and revised 1,410 regulatory 
documents.  See also Li Li (李立), Quanguo Zhuanxiang Qingli Youguan Zhengdi 
Chaiqian Guizhang he Guifanxing Wenjian (全国专项清理有关征地拆迁规章和
规范性文件) [Reviewing Regulatory Documents on Expropriation and House 
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always operates under tight time constraints.  Most of ministries of 
the State Council and many local governments apply the method 
“Three Unification”(San Tongyi) including unified register, unified 
coding, and unified announcement.  Three Unification first was 
adopted in Hunan.83  That means that the authorities must register in 
the record at the same time they are given unified codes.84  Only after 
the above process has occurred can regulatory documents be 
published on the government gazette, specified newspaper, and 
official website.  Three Unification plays a role in the supervision of 
regulatory documents and become an important requirement for  
regulatory documents.85  
It must be said, however, that the functioning of the 
aforementioned channels of review are not as effective as they may 
appear at first glance.86  Whether in Recording and Review, Sorting 
Out, or Three Unification, there is no correspondent or applicant or 
any real dispute, thus each is simply a form of self-examination of 
agencies and congresses.  After finishing the above measures, 
administrative organs and congresses publish a general report about 
the number of annulled or altered documents without providing finer 
details.  Compared to the above channels, allowing ordinary people 
 
83 Hunansheng Xingzheng Chengxu Guiding(湖南省行政程序规
定)[Hunan Provincial Administrative Procedure Provisions] (promulgated by the 
Hunan Provincial People’s Government,April 9, 2008,effective Oct 1, 2008) art. 
49.  
84 Guangxi Shixing Guifanxing Wenjian Santongyi Zhidu (广西实行规范性
文件”三统一”制度) [Guangxi Adopted Three Unification of Regulatory 
Documents System], ZHONGGUO CAIJINGBAO (中国财经报) [CHINA FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC NEWS] (Oct.17, 2017), 
http://www.cfen.com.cn/dzb/dzb/page_2/201710/t20171017_2722162.html 
[https://perma.cc/42Z4-SE8D]. 
85 Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Jiaqiang Xingzheng Guifanxing 
Wenjian Zhiding he Jiandu Guanli Gongzuo de Tongzhi (国务院办公厅关于加
强行政规范性文件制定和监督管理工作的通知) [Notice to Strengthen 
Enactment and Supervision of Administrative Regulatory Documents] (published 
by the General Office of the State Council) (promulgated by the General Office of 
the State Council, May 31, 2018), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2018-
05/31/content_5295071.htm [http://perma.cc/WNU2-CA2Y].  
86 See Keith J. Hand, Understanding China’s System for Addressing 
Legislative Conflicts: Capacity Challenges and the Search for Legislative 
Harmony, COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 26, 139 (2013) (discussing local filing and review 
systems). 
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to challenge regulatory documents in court has clear advantages.  
Only real disputes can test the legality and reasonableness of 
regulatory documents accurately and quickly.  A plaintiff who brings 
forward a concrete infringement of rights or benefits will more 
effectively bring attention to problems in regulatory documents.  As 
Professor Zhan Zhongle said, “[b]y expanding the scope of 
administrative jurisdiction, the legitimate rights of the administrative 
counterpart can be protected in time”. 87   Using administrative 
litigation to correct regulatory documents is more targeted, costs less, 
and saves time.   
Moreover, there are no conflicts between administrative 
litigation and other channels. 88   Judicial review of regulatory 
documents cannot substitute other channels.  Rather, they will 
coordinate together to contribute to the development of rule of law in 
China.   
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATORY DOCUMENTS 
PROVIDED IN THE REVISED ALL 
Most Chinese officers, judges, and legislators feel more 
comfortable with gradual reform in the scope of review under 
administrative litigation.89  Extending judicial review to regulatory 
documents was considered preferrable to no action or to expanding 
judicial review to cover all abstract administrative actions.  At the 
very least it looked more feasible.  Such a plan was realized in the 
Revised ALL passed by the NPC Standing Committee in December 
 
87 Zhan Zhongle (湛中乐), Lun Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng 
Susongfa De Xiugai (论《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的修改) [On the 
Amendment of the Administrative Procedure Law of China], 7 ZHONGGUO 
FAXUE QIANYAN (中国法学前沿) [FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA] 211, 214 
(2012). 
88 See Ye Bifeng(叶必丰), Dishisizhang Xingzheng Guifan(第十四章 行政
规范)[Chapter 14 Administrative Norms], in DANGDAI ZHONGGUO XINGZHENGFA 
(当代中国行政法) [Contemporary Administrative Law in China] (Ying Songnian 
(应松年) ed., 2018) 968–973. 
89 See Ying Songnian (应松年) & Yang Weidong (杨伟东), Woguo 
Xingzheng Susongfa Xiuzheng Chubu Shexiang Shang (我国《行政诉讼法》修
正初步设想(上)) [Tentative Ideas on Amending the Administrative Procedure 
Law of China I], 10 ZHONGGUO SIFA (中国司法) [JUST. OF CHINA] 28, 28–31 
(2004). 
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2014. 90   It provided the formal judicial review of regulatory 
documents in Article 53 and Article 64.  These two articles should be 
regarded as the foremost innovation of the administrative litigation 
system and a milestone for supervision of administrative organs.91  
Those who have not been involved in the long history of debate about 
and legislation of the ALL cannot imagine how difficult it is to 
stipulate these two articles in the Revised ALL.   
 
Article 53 of the Revised ALL provides: 
Where a citizen, a legal person, or any other 
organization deems that a regulatory document 
developed by a department of the State Council or by 
a local people’s government or a department thereof, 
based on which the alleged administrative action was 
taken, is illegal, the citizen, legal person, or other 
organization may concurrently file a request for 
review of the regulatory document when filing a 
complaint against the administrative action.  The term 
“regulatory document” as mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph does not include administrative rules.92   
Article 64 of the Revised ALL provides: 
Where, in trying an administrative case, a people’s 
court deems that any regulatory document as 
mentioned in Article 53 of this Law under its review 
is illegal, such a document shall not be used to 
determine the legality of the alleged administrative 
action, and the people’s court shall provide the 
 
90 Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ.  
91 Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ. 
92 Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ., art. 53. 
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authority developing the document with disposition 
recommendations.93   
Articles 5394 and Article 6495 include the following important 
points: First, courts are granted the authority to review the abstract 
administrative actions formally and openly.  Second, courts can only 
review regulatory documents under rules instead of all abstract 
administrative actions.  Third, courts can only review regulatory 
documents together with specific administrative actions, instead of 
accepting separate requests to review the regulatory documents 
independently.  The plaintiff is allowed to sue a regulatory document 
because the sued specific action is caused by the regulatory document.  
In order to reduce illegal specific actions, the court need to review 
regulatory documents. 96   Thus, the judicial review of regulatory 
documents is an incidental review.  Fourth, if a court finds that one 
regulatory document is illegal, its only recourse is to refuse to apply 
the regulatory document.  The court may not render a judgment 
announcing whether a regulatory document is legal or illegal in the 
Revised ALL.  Last, the court must submit the recommendation to 
the administrative organs which stipulate the regulatory document.   
It was a big step for the Revised ALL to expand the scope of 
judicial review to regulatory documents.97  Xin Chunying, the vice 
 
93 Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ., art. 64. 
94 Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ.  
95 Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ.  
96 Xin Chunying(信春鹰), Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng 
Susongfa Xiuzheng’an Caoan de Shuoming (关于《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法
修正案(草案)》的说明) [Interpretation on the Draft of Administrative Litigation 
Law Amendment of People’s Republic of China], ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中
国人大网) [CHINA NPC], http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2014-
12/23/content_1892443.htm [https://perma.cc/N9UA-KKJW]. 
97 Yang Weihan (杨维汉), Fayuan Kedui Guizhang Yixia Zhengfu “Hongtou 
Wenjian” Fudai Shencha (法院可对规章以下政府“红头文件”附带审查) [The 
Court Will Have the Authority to Review the Red-headed Documents below the 
Level of Regulations Incidentally], RENMIN WANG (人民网)[PEOPLE’S DAILY 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/5
358 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 16 
 
director of the Legal Affairs Commission of the NPC at the time, 
praised that allowing the court to conduct review for regulatory 
documents was a symbol of societal progress.98  Judicial review will 
no longer be toothless when courts have the power to review 
regulatory documents.  The author believes that provisions in Article 
53 and Article 64 themselves are two significant achievements,99  not 
only because courts have the power to supervise more administrative 
actions and better protect citizens’ rights and interests, but also 
because this change will play an increasing role in strengthening and 
improving governance of governments in China.   
Meanwhile, due to the uncertain outcome of regulatory 
documents regarded as illegal by courts, the Revised ALL is far from 
scholarly expectation and aspiration.  Perhaps it cannot be regarded 
as a complete realization of its ideal design.  Rather, it was a 
compromise that grew out of different opinions on how to respond to 
the need to develop administrative litigation and to the thirst to settle 
disputes between citizens and governments in China.  In the six years 
since the implementation of the Revised ALL, the two articles have 
paved the way for strengthening the authority of the courts and 
changing the relationship between the courts and the administrative 
organs.  Hence, having courts review regulatory documents mingles 
hope and fear.   
VI. PENDING ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
REGULATORY DOCUMENTS 
The Judicial Interpretation of the Revised ALL in 2015, the 
Judicial Interpretation of the Revised ALL in 2018, and the first 
 
ONLINE] (Dec. 24, 2013, 10:08 AM), 
http://npc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1224/c14576-23930829.html 
[http://perma.cc/7VQH-4E9S]. 
98 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINGZHENG SUSONGFA SHIYI (中华人
民共和国行政诉讼法释义) [Interpretation of the Administrative Litigation Law 
of the People’s Republic of China] 139 (Xin Chunying ed., 2014). 
99 Another important change in the Revised ALL is to change the expression 
of specific administrative actions to administrative actions in Article 12 
concerning the scope of judicial review because administrative contracts can be 
sued according to the Revised ALL. Revised ALL (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) STANDING 
COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., art. 12. 
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typical cases of incidental review of the regulatory documents 
published by the Supreme People’s Court all have contributed to the 
development of the new mechanism, since the implementation of the 
Revised ALL.  But there still are many pending issues regarding the 
judicial review of regulatory documents.   
i.  The Judicial Interpretation of the Revised ALL in 2015 and the 
First Case of Incidental Review of Regulatory Documents 
After the promulgation of the Revised ALL, the Supreme 
People’s Court published the Judicial Interpretation to give more 
details for those new changes including judicial review of regulatory 
documents.  The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Several Issues of the Implementation of the Administrative Litigation 
Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 
Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa 
Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi] (hereinafter 2015 Judicial Interpretation), 
which passed on April 20, 2015 and took effect on May 1, 2015, 
stipulated two articles about judicial review of regulatory 
documents. 100   It solved some basic questions including when a 
plaintiff files a request for review of a regulatory document. 101  
According to the 2015 Judicial Interpretation, if a plaintiff 
concurrently files a request for review of a regulatory document while 
filing a complaint against the administrative action according to 
Article 53 of the Revised ALL, the plaintiff shall file the request 
before the trial of the first instance; but with a good reason, may file 
during the investigative stage of the court session.102  If a regulatory 
document is deemed illegal and unfit to determine the legality of the 
administrative action, the people’s court shall explain in a statement 
of reasons.  The people’s court shall provide the authority developing 
 
100 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (最高
人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》若干问题的解释) [The 
Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues of the 
Implementation of the Administrative Litigation Law of People’s Republic of 
China] (Apr. 27, 2015, 11:11), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-
14294.html [https://perma.cc/QA2H-ELGT] [hereinafter 2015 Judicial 
Interpretation]. 
101 Id. 
       102 Id. at art. 20. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/5
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the regulatory document with disposition recommendations and it 
may send a copy to the government at the corresponding level of the 
authority developing the regulatory document or the next higher 
administrative organ.103   
After implementation of the Revised ALL, courts at different 
levels accepted some cases involving regulatory documents.  At the 
end of 2015, the first administrative litigation involving legality 
review of regulatory documents of ministries under the State Council 
was reported by the media.104  The plaintiff, a medicine company, 
applied for a trademark from the Trademark Bureau of the former 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce.105   In the same 
month, two other companies also applied for a trademark on the same 
name.  The Trademark Bureau grouped the applications from the 
three companies into one day based on a regulatory document 
published by the Trademark Bureau.  The document stated that one 
month should be classified as one day.  The plaintiff filed the request 
to review the document concurrently while suing the Trademark 
Bureau.  The court of first instance made the judgment that the 
provision of the explanation of “one day” in the document conflicted 
with common sense as well as the related provisions in General 
Principles of The Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China 
[Zhonghua Renmnin Gongheguo Minfa Zongze]106 and violated the 
 
103 Id. at art. 21. 
104 Anhui Huayuan Su Shangbiaoju An Zuo Kaiting(安徽华源诉商标局案昨
开庭)[Anhui Huayua v. Trademark Office Case Was in Session Yesterday), 
JIANCHA RIBAO(检察日报)[THE PROCURATORATE DAILY] (Sept. 18, 2015).  
105 Anhui Huayuan Yiyao Gongsi, Guojia Gongshang Zongju Shangbiaoju 
(安徽华源医药公司,国家工商总局商标局) [Huayuan Medicine Co., Ltd. v. 
Trademark Office of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce], 
ZHONGGUO XIANZHENGWANG (中国宪政网) [CALAW. CN] (Beijing IP Ct. Dec. 
8, 2015), http://www.calaw.cn/article/default.asp?id=11976 
[http://perma.cc/6WMA-LRC2]. 
106 It was substituted by Original Minfa Zongze (民法总则) [General 
Provisions of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by 
the 5th Session of the 12th Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 
2017), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2017-03/15/content_2018907.htm 
[http://perma.cc/YW8B-J25K]. Now the General Provisions of Civil Law have 
been absorbed in Civil Law Code.  See Minfadian (民法典) [Civil Law Code of 
of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 3th Session of the 13th 
Nat’l People’s Cong., May. 28, 2020, effective Jan. 1, 2021), 
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Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiaofa]. 107  So the court rendered the 
judgment to revoke the alleged administrative action in 2015.108  The 
scholars discussed the case carefully and believed that judicial review 
of regulatory documents can be shaped in individual cases.109  Then 
judges and scholars conducted further research on contents under and 
intensity of review, recommendation, and other related issues. 110  
Later, the court of second instance reviewed the case and rendered 
the judgement that the original judgement is clear in fact-finding but 




107 Shangbiaofa (商标法) [Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the 24th Session of the 5th Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 
23, 1982, effective Mar. 1, 1982; revised April 23, 2019), 
http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2020-12/24/content_5572941.htm 
[https://perma.cc/E4MH-YJXW]. 
108 Anhui Huayuan Yiyao Gongsi, Guojia Gongshang Zongju Shangbiaoju 
(安徽华源医药公司,国家工商总局商标局) [Huayuan Medicine Co., Ltd. v. 
Trademark Office of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce], 
ZHONGGUO XIANZHENGWANG (中国宪政网) [CALAW. CN] (Beijing IP Ct. Dec. 
8, 2015), http://www.calaw.cn/article/default.asp?id=11976 
[http://perma.cc/6WMA-LRC2]. 
109 Xu Xiaodong (徐肖东), Xingzheng Susong Guifanxing Wenjian Fudai 
Shencha de Renzhi Jiqi Shixian Jizhi—yi Chen Aihua An yu Huayuan Gongsi An 
Weizhu de Fenxi (行政诉讼规范性文件附带审查的认知及其实现机制—以陈
爱华案与华源公司案为主的分析) [Recognition and Realization Mechanism of 
Incidental Review of Regulatory Documents in Administrative Litigation: Taking 
Chen Aihua Case and Huayuan Gongsi Case as Main Examples], 6 XINGZHENG 
FAXUE YANJIU (行政法学研究) [ADMIN. L. REV.] 69, 75–78 (2016). 
110 Zhu Mang (朱芒), Guifanxing Wenjian de Hefaxing Yaojian—Shouli 
Fudaixing Sifa Shencha Panjueshu Pingxi (规范性文件的合法性要件—首例附
带性司法审查判决书评析) [Elements of Legality of Regulatory Documents: 
Analysis of First Incidental Judicial Review Judgment], 11 FAXUE (法学) [LAW 
SCI.] 151, 152–160 (2016); Zhang Jiansheng (章剑生), Lun Xingzheng Susong 
zhong Guifanxing Wenjian de Hefaxing Shencha (论行政诉讼中规范性文件的
合法性审查) [On Legality Review of Regulatory Documents in Administrative 
Litigation], 3 FUJIAN XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO (福建行政学院学报) [J. 
FUJIAN ADMIN. INST.] 9, 9–16 (2016). 
111 Anhui Huayuan Yiyao Gongsi, Guojia Gongshang Zongju Shangbiaoju 
(安徽华源医药公司,国家工商总局商标局) [Huayuan Medicine Co., Ltd. v. 
Trademark Office of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce], 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/5
362 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 16 
 
pointed out that according to the second paragraph of Article 74 of 
the Revised ALL, an administrative action shall be revoked according 
to the law, but if the revocation is anticipated to cause any significant 
damage to national or public interest, the legality of the alleged action 
may be confirmed as illegal, but the action may not be revoked.112  In 
this case, the court adopted the agency’s opinion and believed that 
revocation of the alleged administrative action will cause damage to 
public interest.113  Obviously the second instance court was more 
cautious in dealing with incidental review of the regulatory document.  
As the first case for this new mechanism, it represents the attitude of 
the courts that want to take action without pursuing greater changes, 
which are inherently disruptive.  From a judicial perspective, the 
courts may be right to preserve their conservatism.  However, any 
regulatory document is related to public interest, so it is easy for an 
agency to exploit damage to public interest as an excuse.  It looks like 
the court of second instance solved the dilemma.  Judicial review of 
regulatory documents may be toothless if few administrative actions 
are revoked and if confirmation of legality only means administrative 
compensation.  Since the courts have to implement the related articles 
of incidental review of the regulatory documents—and plaintiffs are 
increasingly raising questions about the legality of regulatory 
documents—more and more local courts are calling for further 
stipulation of the new mechanism which has become one of the 
hottest issues in the realm of new legal judicial interpretation.   
 
ZHONGGUO XIANZHENGWANG (中国宪政网) [CALAW. CN] (Beijing IP Ct. Dec. 
8, 2015), http://www.calaw.cn/article/default.asp?id=11976 
[http://perma.cc/6WMA-LRC2]. 
112 Anhui Huayuan Yiyao Gongsi, Guojia Gongshang Zongju Shangbiaoju 
(安徽华源医药公司,国家工商总局商标局) [Huayuan Medicine Co., Ltd. v. 
Trademark Office of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce], 
ZHONGGUO XIANZHENGWANG (中国宪政网) [CALAW. CN] (Beijing IP Ct. Dec. 
8, 2015), http://www.calaw.cn/article/default.asp?id=11976 
[http://perma.cc/6WMA-LRC2]. 
113 Anhui Huayuan Yiyao Gongsi, Guojia Gongshang Zongju Shangbiaoju 
(安徽华源医药公司,国家工商总局商标局) [Huayuan Medicine Co., Ltd. v. 
Trademark Office of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce], 
ZHONGGUO XIANZHENGWANG (中国宪政网) [CALAW. CN] (Beijing IP Ct. Dec. 
8, 2015), http://www.calaw.cn/article/default.asp?id=11976 
[http://perma.cc/6WMA-LRC2]. 
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ii.  The Judicial Interpretation of the Revised ALL in 2018 
Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the 
Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s 
Republic of China [Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi] 
(hereinafter 2018 Judicial Interpretation) was adopted on November 
3, 2017 and took effect on February 8, 2018; meanwhile the 2015 
Judicial Interpretation mentioned above was annulled.114  The 2018 
Judicial Interpretation absorbed all the provisions of the 2015 Judicial 
Interpretation and improved related provisions concerning judicial 
review of regulatory documents.  This new Judicial Interpretation 
aims to establish a comprehensive system for the review of regulatory 
documents with five lengthy provisions covering different kinds of 
issues.   
First, the 2018 Judicial Interpretation establishes an 
independent trial process for regulatory documents with confirmation 
of power of the court and right of the agency.  Article 147 provides 
that a people’s court shall hear the authority developing the document 
when it finds that regulatory document may be illegal.115  Hearings 
can be conducted in various ways under this context. 116   The 
 
114 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018, 11:20 AM), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPM-
QY7W] [hereinafter 2018 Judicial Interpretation]. 
115 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 147, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPM-
QY7W] . 
116 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
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Interpretation does not prohibit ex parte contacts.  That means the 
administrative bodies shall take part in the trial process.  It is not the 
defendant but rather a participant because this is not a formal 
litigation process.  Though the Interpretation requires that, if the 
authority developing the document requests an agency state its 
opinion in court, the people’s court must allow it.117  Thus, the agency 
may show up in court or state its opinion through one of a handful of 
channels, including submitting a written opinion.  This provision 
creates enough room for the court to collect opinions from the agency 
and for the agency to express its opinions.  The provision also 
stipulates that an agency that does not state an opinion or provide 
related testimony may not stop the court from reviewing regulatory 
documents.118 
From the provision itself, the trial of regulatory documents 
can be an independent phase in administrative litigation.119  However, 
there are some unsolved questions, for example, how the court 
informs the authority developing the document especially when the 
court at the grassroots level accepts a case involving the legality of 
regulatory documents published by ministries and commissions 
under the State Council.  The further question is whether the court 
 
117 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 147, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPM-
QY7W]. 
118 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 147, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPM-
QY7W]. 
119 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 147, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPM-
QY7W]. 
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has the obligation to collect evidence for regulatory documents if the 
agency does not provide any evidence or opinion without good cause.  
In normal administrative litigations in China, the defendant bears the 
burden of proof.  That means if the agency does not provide evidence 
for the contested administrative action, it will lose the case.  The 
outcome in the review of regulatory documents is different from 
normal administrative litigations.  Even if the agencies do not provide 
evidence or opinions, the regulatory document will not be considered 
illegal.  Thus the agency has no incentive to provide evidence or 
opinions.  Furthermore, it is impossible for the agencies to provide 
opinions or evidence in every case.  So it is uncertain that this 
provision will be implemented well.   
Second, the Judicial Interpretation stipulates clear review 
contents and review standards.  Article 148 provides that the court 
shall review the legality of regulatory documents but not the question 
of reasonableness. 120   The contents of review of regulatory 
documents include whether the agency oversteps power, violates 
statutory procedures, and so on.  The provision defines “illegal” in 
regulatory documents as follows: (1) Outside the statutory remit of 
the developing authority, or beyond the authorization by the law, 
regulations, or rules; (2) Contravening the provisions of any law, 
regulations, rules, or any other superordinate law; (3) Without a basis 
in any law, regulations or rules, illegally increasing any obligation, or 
derogating from the lawful rights and interests, of any citizen, legal 
person, or any other organization; (4) Failing to comply with the 
statutory approval procedure or the public issuance procedure, or 
seriously violating the development procedure; (5) Otherwise 
violating the law, regulations, or rules.121   
 
120 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 148, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPM-
QY7W]. 
121 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 148, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/5
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The provision stipulates the standards for reviewing original 
administrative litigation to some extent.  Comparatively speaking, 
overstepping power or authority in the first standard is easier to judge 
and make a conclusion.  The second standard about whether the 
regulatory document contravenes higher rank laws is not too difficult.  
However it is rather difficult to review the procedure requirements.  
Due to rough and few procedure requirements of regulatory 
documents, we still cannot predict how the court would review the 
procedure requirements.  In the first case involving regulatory 
documents issued by ministry under the State Council in 2015, the 
court conducted trials for only the one article deemed controversial 
and alleged illegal by the plaintiff, but did not review matter of power 
or procedure.  The 2018 Judicial Interpretation is obviously different 
from the review in the above case.  The court shall review every 
aspect according to this Interpretation.  Combined with Article 147, 
Article 148 does not list evidence as the content of legality, which 
also implies that the agency does not bear the burden of proof in 
judicial review of regulatory documents, although burden of proof is 
a common requirement in judicial review of concrete administrative 
actions.  It still remains to be seen whether it will discourage agencies 
from taking judicial review of regulatory documents seriously.   
Third, the Interpretation stipulates a multitude of details 
concerning disposition recommendations of the courts.  Article 149 
provides the time, the form, and the outcome of recommendations if 





122 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 149, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPM-
QY7W]. 
123 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 149, 
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(1) Only if a regulatory document is deemed legal can it be 
the basis of administrative action.  If the court deems a regulatory 
document as illegal, the court shall explain the determination in a 
statement of reasons.124   
(2) The court shall provide the authority developing the 
document with disposition recommendations.  Meanwhile it may 
send a copy to four kinds of state organs: 
a) the government at the corresponding level of the 
authority developing the document; 
b) the next higher administrative organ; 
c) the supervision organ(s); 
d) the recording and review authority of regulatory 
documents.125   
The scope of state organs to which recommendations should 
be sent in the 2018 Judicial Interpretation is broader than that in the 
2015 Judicial Interpretation.  The supervision organs here mainly 
refer to the supervision commissions which are also emphasized in 
the organ reform and revision of the Constitution in 2018, which play 
a role in the whole state structure and are intended to supervise 
regulatory documents more efficiently.  Copying the 
recommendation to the supervision organs provides more clues to the 
supervision organs.  The recording and review authority will also 
receive a copy of the recommendation, which signals cooperation 
between the recording and review system and the judicial review 




124 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 149, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPM-
QY7W].  
125 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
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(3) The court shall raise suggestions to revise or annul 
regulatory documents to the authority developing the regulatory 
documents within three months of the effectiveness of the judgment.  
If the regulatory documents are stipulated by several departments, the 
court may send recommendations to the sponsoring authority or 
to their common administrative organ at the next higher level.  This 
provision aims to solve the dispute over the definition of 
responsibility of respective governments when documents are 
stipulated by several departments.126   
(4) The administrative organs who get recommendations shall 
respond in written form within 60 days.  If the situation is urgent, the 
court may suggest the authority developing the document or the next 
higher government stop execution immediately.  This provision is 
very important for the implementation of recommendations.  
Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether the government shall be 
treated as “contempt of court” as in normal administrative litigation 
if they refuse to implement the recommendation.127   
Forth, it stipulates the supervision procedure in the court 
system in Article 150 and Article 151.128   
 
126 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 149, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPM-
QY7W]. 
127 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 149, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPM-
QY7W]. 
128 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 150, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPM-
QY7W]. 
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(1) The judgment shall be recorded to the next higher court if 
a regulatory document is deemed as illegal.  When the document is 
stipulated by ministries under the State Council or by provincial 
governments, judicial recommendations shall also be submitted to the 
Supreme People’s Court or the Higher People’s Court to record and 
review.  In order to prevent destroying uniformity of the legal system, 
lower level courts should report to higher level courts during the 
review process.  This provision does not specify what higher level 
courts should do after receiving recommendations.  One possible 
action is to collect information and publish a related judgment or 
recommendation to all courts.  Another possible action is to inform 
the relevant government that has the authority over the document in 
question.129   
(2) If the president of a people’s court at any level discovers 
that an effective judgment or ruling of the court makes a wrong 
determination of legality of regulatory documents and deems a retrial 
necessary, the president shall submit the case to the judicial 
committee of the court for discussion.  The provision aims to solve 
the problem of how to find and correct wrong judgment of regulatory 
documents.  The person who holds the authority to raise the issue is 
the president, and the body that maintains the authority to retry the 
case is the judicial committee of the court.  So the retrial process is 
also incorporated in the judicial review of regulatory documents.130   
(3) If the Supreme People’s Court, or people’s court at any 
level, discovers that any effective judgment or ruling of the court 
makes a wrong determination of legality of regulatory documents, 
 
129 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 150, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPM-
QY7W]. 
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Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
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they reserve the power to directly retry the case or specify the 
people’s court at a lower level to retry the case.  The provision 
stipulates additional content for the trial supervision procedure which 
keeps pace with the whole supervision procedure in administrative 
litigation.131   
iii.  The First Batch of Typical Cases of Incidental Review of the 
Regulatory Document 
Since the 2018 Judicial Interpretation took effect in February, 
more and more local courts began to implement this Interpretation to 
review regulatory documents.  In May 2018, the Supreme People’s 
Court promptly drafted the individual Judicial Interpretation for 
judicial review of regulatory documents which was ranked in the 
project’s initial plan of the  judicial interpretation by the Supreme 
People’s Court in 2018.132 The reason why the Supreme People’s 
Court did so was that lower courts remained confused about the 
judicial review of regulatory documents.  The Supreme People’s 
Court wanted to provide confidence, support, and techniques to push 
forward judicial review of regulatory documents, though it is not easy 
to reach consensus on consequential issues.  On October 30, 2018, 
the Supreme People’s Court published nine typical administrative 
litigation cases with incidental review of the regulatory documents.133  
 
131 SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
适用《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People’s Court on the Application of the Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (Feb. 07, 2018), art. 151, 
http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-80342.html [http://perma.cc/8TPM-
QY7W]. 
132 Supreme People’s Court, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 2018 Niandu Sifa 
Jieshi Lixiang Jihua (最高人民法院 2018年度司法解释立项计划) [The Project 
Initial Plan of the Judicial Interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court in 2018], 
CHINA COURT.ORG (July 17, 2018, 10:34 PM), 
http://www.sohu.com/a/241822337_164794 [http://perma.cc/3V8Z-EHE5]. 
133 Supreme People’s Court, Xingzheng Susong Fudai Shencha Guifanxing 
Wenjian Dianxing Anli (行政诉讼附带审查规范性文件典型案例) [Typical 
Administrative Litigation Cases with Incidental Review of Regulatory 
Documents], CHINA COURT.ORG (Oct. 30, 2018, 11:19 AM), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-125871.html [http://perma.cc/GP24-
3R28]. 
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The Administrative Tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court 
introduced that all these typical cases were the first batch of cases 
since the implementation of the Revised ALL.  Courts across the 
country already reviewed 3,880 cases incidentally in the first instance 
from January 2016 to October 2018.134  These cases are typically 
about medical insurance, public security, price administration, drug 
administration, land approval, environment supervision, enforcement, 
and administrative compensation.  It looks like the Supreme People’s 
Court aims to state their opinions about the incidental review of the 
regulatory documents among nine typical cases.   
(1) In three cases, the courts finally stated that the regulatory 
documents were illegal; while four regulatory documents were legal.  
Regardless of whether the regulatory documents were legal or illegal, 
the courts conducted formal review in seven cases according to the 
enactments of Judicial Interpretation published in the Spring of 2018, 
applying the review standards including whether the drafting body, 
drafting goal, and drafting procedure comply with legal enactments 
and whether there is any obvious illegal provision in the regulatory 
documents.135   
(2) In the eighth case, the court declared that due to procedural 
reasons the administrative action under litigation should fall within 
the scope of administrative litigation and the regulatory documents 
should not be reviewed incidentally.136  In the last case, the court 
 
134 Supreme People’s Court, Xingzheng Susong Fudai Shencha Guifanxing 
Wenjian Dianxing Anli Xinwen Fabuhui (行政诉讼附带审查规范性文件典型案
例新闻发布会) [News Release Conference on Typical Administrative Litigation 
Cases with Incidental Review of Regulatory Documents], CHINA COURT.ORG 
(Oct. 30, 2018, 11:10 AM), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-
125531.html [http://perma.cc/3KYK-VCFR]. 
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Administrative Litigation Cases with Incidental Review of Regulatory 
Documents], CHINA COURT.ORG (Oct. 30, 2018, 11:19 AM), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-125871.html [http://perma.cc/GP24-
3R28]. 
136 Supreme People’s Court, Mao Aimei & Zhu Hongxing Su Zhejiangsheng 
Jiangshanshi Hecunzhen Renmin Zhengfu Xingzheng Qiangzhi ji Xingzheng 
Peichang An (毛爱梅、祝洪兴诉浙江省江山市贺村镇人民政府行政强制及行
政赔偿案) [Administrative Enforcement and Administrative Compensation Case 
of Mao Aimei & Zhu Hongxing v. Hecun County Government of Jiangshan City 
in Zhejiang Province], CHINA COURT.ORG (OCT. 30, 2018, 11:28 AM), 
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pointed out that the regulatory documents the plaintiff requested to 
review were not the legal basis for administrative action under 
litigation, which means judicial review is only incidental review for 
the related provisions or the provisions that form a legal basis, rather 
than all provisions.137   
(3) The intention of the Supreme People’s Court is to reaffirm 
that the courts have the authority to review the regulatory documents 
and the details of this new mechanism are becoming clearer.  For 
example, in the fifth case, the court believed that the typical case was 
helpful to acknowledge the legal rights of the female and protect them 
better.  However, the Supreme People’s Court did not provide further 
conclusions about how the mechanism of incidental review of 
regulatory documents should perform.138   
The number of incidental review cases of administrative 
regulatory documents increased after the revised ALL became 
effective in 2017, reaching a peak in 2019 then subsequently 




137 Supreme People’s Court, Chengdu Jinpai Tianshi Yiliao Keji Youxian 
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Xingzheng Xuke An (成都金牌天使医疗科技有限责任公司诉四川省成都市科
学技术局科技项目资助行政许可案) [Administrative Licence Case of Chengdu 
Gold Metal Angel Medical Technology Co., Ltd v. Chengdu Science and 
Technology Bureau in Sichuan Province], CHINA COURT.ORG (Oct. 30, 2018, 
11:25 AM), https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2018/10/id/3551944.shtml 
[http://perma.cc/TST9-9NDM]. 
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Government in Zhejiang Province], CHINA COURT.ORG (Oct. 30, 2018, 11:25 
AM), https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2018/10/id/3551934.shtml 
[http://perma.cc/4NRK-U7QG]. 
139 According to the statistics provided by the website of the Supreme Court, 
there were 15,457 cases in 2020, 20,970 cases in 2019, and 18,721 cases in 2018, 
which may be related to regulatory documents. Concerning formal judgments, 
there were 10,414 cases in 2020, 14,761 cases in 2019, and 12,968 cases in 2018.  
Following the News Release Conference on Typical Administrative Litigation 
Cases with Incidental Review of Regulatory Documents in 2018, the Supreme 
Court did not published any report or statistics about incidental review of 
administrative regulatory documents, so the number of cases is unknown.  See 
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Congress, and the Supreme People’s Court design the system of 
judicial review of regulatory documents, key problems will persist in 
the short term given that the practice of judicial review has not 
fundamentally changed and the government remains more powerful 
than the courts.  Yet the environment is slowly changing.  Lower level 
courts are showing greater courage and incentive to review regulatory 
documents published by higher level governments.  The governments 
also are making efforts to improve regulatory documents and push 
forward the rule of law in government.  Regardless of what comes 
next, the gate of judicial review of regulatory documents has been 
opened, and the momentum will continue forward rather than 
reviving the past.  Questions and problems will continue to emerge 
and deserve thorough discussion along the way.   
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